On Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and Iran

With diplomatic talks underway in Islamabad, a major sticking point is likely to be Iran's 60% enriched uranium.

The question on everyone’s mind is if Iran will agree to give up its 440 kilograms of enriched uranium. President Trump recently proclaimed on his Truth Social account that this material lies underneath the rubble of last June Operation Midnight Hammer attack, though no one else seems to believe this assertion.

Benjamin Netanyahu claimed in February that the Iranian’s not only still had their hands on the material, but would soon enrich it to weapons grade and use it to attack the US and Israel.

Several of my friends—including a couple of Israeli friends—have written to assure me that the US and Israel must obtain this material at all costs, as they believe the Iranians will certainly fashion it into a nuclear weapon and go on the offensive with it.

A few months ago, one of my favorite pen pals assured me that the Iranian regime is an irrational actor and will not recognize or be constrained by the Cold War doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

It’s a fascinating twist of history that the current negotiations are taking place in Islamabad, Pakistan, because the same proclamations were made about Pakistan when it was working to acquire an atomic bomb. A Grok query about this episode yielded the following.

Pakistani rhetoric supporting Palestinian causes and its self-image as a defender of the Islamic world led Israeli officials to view a nuclear Pakistan as a potential supplier to Arab states or terrorists hostile to the Jewish state. As early as 1979, Prime Minister Menachem Begin warned allies of the “threat posed by Pakistan’s nuclear program.” Israeli intelligence, Mossad, responded with covert operations. Between 1979 and 1981, suspected Mossad-orchestrated sabotage targeted European suppliers of centrifuge technology and dual-use equipment to Pakistan, including parcel bombs and assassinations of key intermediaries. Israeli planners even considered direct military action: in the mid-1980s, the Israeli Air Force reportedly rehearsed strikes on Pakistan’s Kahuta enrichment facility using F-15s and F-16s, possibly with Indian assistance or basing. U.S. intelligence reportedly tipped off Pakistan about these plans, averting escalation, as Washington balanced its alliances. Assassination plots against A.Q. Khan himself were allegedly prepared but never executed.

Despite these multifaceted efforts—diplomatic pressure, sanctions, intelligence sharing, and covert sabotage—Pakistan achieved nuclear capability by the mid-1980s and conducted overt tests in May 1998. The program succeeded through clandestine procurement, Chinese assistance, and domestic resilience. U.S. and Israeli actions delayed progress but were undermined by competing strategic interests: America’s Afghan priorities and Israel’s logistical limits against a distant target. Today, Pakistan maintains an estimated 170 warheads.

After reading about Pakistan’s program, I performed the following Grok query about Iran.

What is the evidence that the Iranian regime is an irrational actor that does not recognize, and will not be governed by the Cold War doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)? Has the Iranian regime taken actions that are consistent with suicidal irrationality?

Grok responded as follows.

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There is limited, mostly speculative or rhetorical evidence that the Iranian regime is an “irrational actor” that rejects the Cold War doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), and virtually no concrete evidence of state-level actions that demonstrate suicidal irrationality. MAD relies on the assumption that rational state actors prioritize national/regime survival above all else and will therefore be deterred from actions (especially nuclear first strikes) that guarantee their own destruction. Critics who argue Iran falls outside this framework typically point to its theocratic ideology, while most strategic analysts (including former Israeli intelligence leaders) conclude the opposite: Iran is a rational, if highly ideological and risk-tolerant, actor that understands deterrence and acts to preserve the regime.

Claimed Evidence for Irrationality / Non-Adherence to MAD

Proponents (often Israeli officials, U.S. hawks, and some think-tank analyses) cite the following:

• Religious ideology and eschatology: The regime is Twelver Shia, with a belief in the eventual return of the Hidden Imam (Mahdi). Some hardliners (especially in the IRGC) interpret major chaos or apocalyptic conflict with “infidels” (Israel/U.S.) as hastening this return, potentially making mutual destruction religiously desirable rather than deterrent. Martyrdom (shahadat) is glorified in official ideology, culture, and propaganda. Critics argue this creates a different cost-benefit calculus than secular rational-actor models.

• Specific statements suggesting asymmetric nuclear thinking:

  • Former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (2001): A single nuclear bomb could destroy Israel entirely, while the Muslim world (with many states) would only be damaged—implying Iran might accept heavy losses in a nuclear exchange.

  • Repeated eliminationist rhetoric against Israel (e.g., threats to “destroy” Tel Aviv/Haifa or wipe out the “Zionist regime”) by leaders including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who blended this with Mahdist/apocalyptic themes.

• Historical willingness to absorb massive casualties: During the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War, Iran launched “human wave” attacks (including child soldiers and Basij volunteers into minefields), accepting 500,000–1 million deaths rather than seeking early peace. This is cited as evidence of ideological fanaticism over pragmatic survival.

• Persistent nuclear pursuit and proxy escalations despite costs: Iran has endured decades of sanctions, sabotage, and strikes while advancing its nuclear program (enrichment to near-weapons grade at times) and arming proxies (Hezbollah, Houthis, Hamas) that conduct attacks risking wider war. Recent 2026 escalations—broad missile/drone strikes and proxy actions across multiple fronts—have been described by Israeli intelligence as “almost suicidal” or “off the rails,” driven by survival desperation rather than cool calculation.

• Rejection of Western deterrence logic: The regime’s theocratic/ideological nature (vs. Soviet-style pragmatic totalitarianism) is said to make it less sensitive to threats of annihilation. Some argue MAD only works between states that share a survival-first paradigm.

These points suggest Iran may not be “governed by” MAD in the same way the U.S. and USSR were—its leaders might calculate that limited nuclear use, proxy chaos, or even regime-ending conflict could serve divine/historical purposes or asymmetric goals.

Counter-Evidence: Iran Behaves as a Rational (If Revisionist) Actor

The weight of empirical analysis points the other way:

• Pragmatic survival behavior over 47 years: Iran has not invaded neighbors (unlike Saddam’s Iraq), has used proxies and deniability to avoid direct regime-ending confrontations, adapted to sanctions, negotiated the JCPOA (2015) to ease pressure, and calibrated responses (e.g., limited direct strikes on Israel after assassinations, followed by de-escalation windows). Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan explicitly called the regime “very rational” and said it weighs implications carefully.

• Nuclear restraint and deterrence awareness: Khamenei issued (or referenced) a fatwa declaring nuclear weapons (especially use) haram/forbidden, though critics note it is oral, focuses more on use than possession, and could be reversed under the Shia principle of expediency if regime survival demanded it. Iran has stayed at the nuclear threshold rather than rushing to a testable weapon—consistent with seeking deterrence without provoking preemptive annihilation. It has not transferred nuclear tech to proxies.

• No suicidal state actions: Proxy terrorism and suicide bombings are asymmetric tools (common in weaker actors), not regime self-immolation. The Iran-Iraq War casualties, while horrific, occurred in a defensive conventional war where both sides suffered massively—standard for ideological conflicts (compare WWII or other total wars). Recent escalations occurred under extreme pressure (strikes on Iranian soil) and reflect wounded-animal survival instincts, not proactive suicide.

• Brinkmanship, not madness: Iran excels at “gray zone” operations, proxies, and calculated risk to expand influence while avoiding existential retaliation. This is rational deterrence-by-denial and cost-imposition, not rejection of MAD. Kenneth Waltz and others have argued a nuclear Iran would likely stabilize the region via classic balancing, as survival remains the regime’s core imperative.

In short, ideology introduces higher risk tolerance and rhetorical extremism, and statements like Rafsanjani’s highlight an asymmetric view of destruction. But there is no behavioral record of the regime knowingly courting its own assured destruction. MAD’s core logic (survival first) appears to hold; the regime has repeatedly chosen preservation over ideological purity when the stakes were existential.

Bottom line: Claims of Iranian suicidal irrationality are more often policy advocacy (for strikes/preemption) than a description of observed reality. Deterrence has constrained Iran for decades and would likely continue to do so—even with nuclear weapons—though the ideological overlay adds uncertainty and demands robust second-strike capabilities and clear red lines from adversaries. The regime is fanatical in rhetoric and ruthless in tactics, but not demonstrably suicidal.

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As President Kennedy vehemently asserted in his letters to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion in April and May 1963, nuclear proliferation is inherently undesirable. It would therefore be far preferable if the US could induce Iran to give up its 60% uranium.

The trouble the US now faces is that it supported Iraq’s 1980-88 war against Iran, has itself twice attacked Iran, killed its religious leader and multiple members of his family, and threatened to end Iranian civilization forever.

Given these circumstances, it’s hard to image what the US could do to induce Iran to give up its uranium. One could make a strong argument that the most rational decision that Iran could now make is to move forward in developing a nuclear deterrent, following in the footsteps of North Korea, which was largely obliterated by the US Air Force in 1950-53.

At the end of his life, Air Force General Curtis LeMay told Air Force historians that 85% of North Korea’s buildings were destroyed and 20% of its civilian population was killed. Nevertheless, the North Korean regime didn’t capitulate. On the contrary, it survived and concluded it had best acquire nuclear weapons to deter further US aggression in the future.

Either Mark Twain or Ambrose Bierce is alleged to have quipped that “God created war so that Americans would learn geography.”

It seems to me that God created war in the vain hope that Americans would learn the limits of military power to coerce other nations to bend to the will of the US government.

In December 2025, President Trump published a video on social media in which he likened his leadership style to that of the frontline commander Maximus Decimus Meridius in the 2000 film Gladiator.

This reminds me of the dialog between Maximus and his general Quintus, just before the opening battle scene against a Germanic tribe along the Danube frontier. Quintus, who soon reveals himself to be a traitor, says of the defiant Germans:

Quintus: "People should know when they're conquered."
Maximus: "Would you, Quintus? Would I?"

Maximus understood that no man chooses to be born into his particular tribe. He is simply thrown into this condition. When a foreign power attacks his tribe, he can therefore be expected to fight to defend his people.

Though I am a proud American, I find the US government odious. Nevertheless, if a foreign power bombed my city, my local police station, my university, and killed some of my friends and family members, I would fight the foreign power to the death.